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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
REAL ESTA TE EXCHANGE,
A Corporation,

Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK ALLEN KINGSTON and

Case

No. 10639

DOROTHY KINGSTON,

Defendants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT
COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY,
HONORABLE PARLEY E. NORSETH, JUDGE

NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff, a licensed real estate broker, sold real property of
defendants that was listed with plaintiff for sale and seeks pay.
ment of the agreed sales commission.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable Parley E. Norseth, sitting without a jury,
dismissed the Complaint of the plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 15th, 1964, defendants were the owners of
certain real property located at Mountain Green, Morgan County,
Utah, upon which there was a commercial venture known as "The
Wheel". This operation consisted of motels, store, restaurant,
camping facilities, service station and trailer park. This property
was listed for sale with plaintiff, a licensed real estate broker
(Plaintiff's Exhibit A). At the same time, plaintiff had received
a listing to sell real estate belonging to George W. Malloy and
wife, Audrey M. Malloy (T. 39). Plaintiff, through one of its
sales agents, Mr. R. Gene Allphin, brought the Kingstons and
Malloys together and as a result plaintiff's Exhibit B was drawn
up, which was an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
on the form approved by the Utah State Securities Commission.
This offer was accepted by the sellers (Kingstons) and provided
for a total sales price for the "The Wheel" for Sixty-six Thousand
Dollars ($66,000.00) with down payment of buyers' (Malloys)
equity in their Davis County property which was agreed to be
Seven Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($7,200.00), and Five
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) to be paid on delivery of the deed
or final contract, and further that the offer was subject to buyer
(Malloys) obtaining satisfactory financing. The Malloys were
not able to obtain satisfactory financing or any financing at all,
which Mrs. Kingston was aware of, inasmuch as she accompanied
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Malloy to four lending institutions for this purpose and Malloy
was refused credit at each one. (T. 56)
The offer to purchase represented by Exhibit B was not pur,ucd for this reason and on July 24, 1964, another Earnest Money
H.eceipt and Offer to Purchase was made up by plaintiff (Exhibit
C) and presented to the defendant, Dorothy Kingston, for acceptance. This offer was accepted the same day by said defendant and provided for a sales price of Sixty-six Thousand Dollars
($66,000.00) with the down payment being the equity in buyers'
(Malloys') real property and home in Davis County, which was
agreed to be in the amount of Seven Thousand Two Hundred
Dollars ($7,200.00). Defendants knew that plaintiff had a sales
listing on the Malloy property as well as on defendants' property
and that plaintiff was working for and representing both buyer
and seller. (T. 49, 50).
Pursuant to the acceptance of this offer to purchase by defendants, plaintiff prepared a Uniform Real Estate Contract,
(Exhibit I) which was signed by George W. Malloy and Audrey
M. Malloy as buyers and Mark Allen Kingston and Dorothy
Kingston as sellers and which was dated August 28, 1964, an
Escrow Agreement dated August 28, 1964, was then prepared
which was signed by the sellers and buyers and was not
signed by the plaintiff broker. At this time a Warranty Deed
was prepared by plaintiff which conveyed to Kingstons, the
defendants, all of the interest of the Malloys in their real property in Davis County, which deed was recorded in the Davis
County Recorder's Office on October 16, 1964. (Exhibit 3). A
Bulk Sales Affidavit was prepared which recited "No creditors
of The Wheel" and closing statements were prepared and issued
to Malloys on the sale of their property and to the Kingstons on
their prop2rty (Exhibits 9 and 10). An Escrow Agreement (Exhibit 2) was prepared together with a Warranty Deed for the
defendants' property (Exhibit 6) and said Escrow Agreement,
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together with the Warranty Deed from the dcfendan!s, the Uniform Real Estate Contract, Bulk Sales Affidavit and an Inven.
tory of Equipment were deposited on October 15, 1964, with the
First Security Bank of Ogden, Utah.
Malloys, the buyers, entered into possession of the Kingston
property on July 25, 1964, and remained until October 30, 1964
(T. 62), when they abandoned it because the property was not
as represented by Mrs. Kingston (T. 63, 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68),
during which time they paid, in addition to the $7,200.00 down
payment, the sum of $270.00 on August 25, 1964 (Exhibit F),
and on September 25, 1964, the sum of $375.00 (Exhibit G)
Defendants made demands upon the First Security Bank, the
escrow agent, for the return of the documents held in escrow and
the same were returned to the defendants.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the defendants declined to offer testimony and the Court granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as it was designated by the Court and
in so doing stated that the grounds were that the plaintiff had
agreed to accept its commission out of monthly payments and the
monthly payments were not forthcoming.
Although the Court found against the plaintiff on the single ground indicated above, the Court signed Findings of Fact
and Decree which found against the plaintiff on three separate
grounds and although it would appear that this appeal should
only be on the basis of the findings of the court as stated at the
conclusion of the trial, nevertheless the plaintiff, in this Brief, shall
controvert the Findings of Fact and Decree as signed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT OBTAIN AN ABLE AND WILL·
ING BUYER OF THE PREMISES OF THE DEFENDANTS.
4

Jt has long been the law in this state, that a real estate broker

h:is f ulfillcd his part of the listing agreement by having produced
purch~1~ers who were ready, willing and able to buy the listed

property on terms acceptable to seller, and is entitled to his commission if he docs so. Curtis vs. Mortensen, 267 P. 2d, 237, 239,
I Utah 2nd 354., F.M.A. Financial Fund vs. Build, Inc., 404 P.

2, 670, 17 Utah 21 80, Garff Realty vs. Better Builders, Inc., 234

P2, 842, 120 Utah 334.
Such were the terms of the listing contract between the parties hereto, the listing agreement (Exhibit A) providing as follows:
"I agree upon the considerations hereinabove mentioned to
pay six per cent ( 6 3) commission covering such transactions whether such sale or exchange be made by you or me
or any other person acting for me or in my behalf at the
price and upon the terms stated on the reverse side hereof,
or at any other price and any other terms acceptable to me;

• * * * * *

"No exchange for property to be transferred to me is to be
made unless the property to be received by me is approved
in writing. If an exchange is made, I agree to pay commission to you on the above sale price, and that you may collect commissions on all property involved in the transaction."
(Italics ours).
Defendant's counsel, evidently with the intention of confusing the issue, made much out of the fact that the listing was for
$75,000.00 but that the sale was for $66,000.00. No money was
realized by defendants and therefore plaintiff had not complied
with the listing contract. However, the Listing Agreement (Exhibit A) as noted above, provided for sale or exchange if the sale
ur exchange be made at the price or terms stated or at any other
price or terms acceptable to the sellers. No one can seriously contend that although the listing contract price was $75,000.00 that
defendants are not bound to pay a sales commission because the
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sale was for $66,000.00. The defendants have accepted the offer
and terms of the buyer and have by so doing stated that the price
and terms were acceptable to them. Further, it was agreed "If an
exchange is made, I agree to pay commissions to you on the above
sale price and tha.t you may collect commission on all properties
involved in the transaction." (Italics ours). It would seem, there-

fore, that defendants are in no position to complain that the
plaintiff did not provide them with an "able" buyer inasmuch as
they did not receive cash from the buyer, because by the very
terms of the listing contract, they contemplated that there would
be an exchange of properties and that if there was an exchange
that they would pay a commission on the sale and on all other
properties involved in the transaction.
In order to entitle a broker to a commission under such an
agreement, our courts have not even required that a binding contract be entered into (Curtis vs. Mortensen Supra.), however, in '
the case before the bar, not only one, but two binding contracts
were entered into between the purchasers and sellers. The first
being the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase signed
by the Malloys as purchasers as accepted by Dorothy Kingston
as seller (Exhibit C) and the second being the Uniform Real Estate Contract signed by Mr. and Mrs. Malloy as buyers and Mr.
and Mrs. Kingston as sellers (Defendants' Exhibit 1).
The sellers have received approximately $7,000.00 by way of
exchange of property from Malloys and $645.00 in cash. Malloys
testify that the reason he gave the property back to Kingstons
was because of the misrepresentations of Mrs. Kingston, the seller,
in regard to income capabilities of the property and debts. Can
it seriously be contended that the buyers, Malloy, were not "willing and able"? If they were not, this was a fact well known to
Mrs. Kingston inasmuch as she accompanied Mr. Malloy to four
lending institutions with the purpose of Mr. Malloy obtaining a
6
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loan or any loan to add to the down payment and she

ii<Js wdl ;mare of the fact that he could not qualify for this purpose with these lending institutions.

A recent Utah case and the one most nearly in point is F.M.A.
Financial Corp. vs. Build, Inc., 404 P. 2d 670, 17 Utah 2d 80. An
npartment house was listed with Cook Realty Co., the seller agreeing to pay a 53 commission on the sale price. Through the eff11rts of the realtor, the seller entered into an Earnest Money
Receipt and Exchange Agreement to sell the apartment house for
$77,500.00 and received from buyers a duplex valued at $25,000.00
as a down payment. A Promissory Note was given for the sales
commission and when not paid, suit was brought on the note.
The seller, although retaining the $25,000.00 down payment, defended the suit claiming lack of consideration because the buyers,
within 60 days after the sale became dissatisfied and brought suit
for rescision which was successfully defended by seller.
The Court held as follows:
"It is indeed the obligation of the real estate broker to produce a buyer willing and able to purchase the property who
enters into an agreement to do so; and that this be done
without any dishonesty, fraud or misrepresentation which
will leave the seller vulnerable to a loss of his bargain. But
that is the extent of his obligation and when it is done he
cannot be held to be an insurer against the possibility that
the buyer may become dissatisfied with his bargain and
bring a lawsuit claiming the right of rescision."
What the established rules of law governing a broker's right
to a commission are, are stated in the California case of Lipton
vs. Johansen 233 P. 2d 648 as follows:
"II. A broker's commission is earned when the vendee and
vendor have executed a binding written agreement between
them upon the terms provided in the contract of employment
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of the broker and the vendee is ready, willing and able to
perform the contract on the terms prescribed.
"III. The readiness, willingness and ability of the vendee
are conclusively presumed in a suit by a broker to recover
his commission upon proof that the vendor has entered intr_,
a valid contract for purchase and sale with the vendee.
(Italics ours)
"IV. The right of the broker to his commission is not affected by failure of either party to carry out the agreement."
In the case of Diamond vs. Huenergardt 346 P. 2d 37 (Cal.)
it is set out as follows:
"It is settled law that where the owner of property accepts
the offer made by a person produced by the broker employed
to make the sale, he thereby admits the readiness, willingness and ability of the purchaser to consumate the sale and
the owner is estopped to deny purchaser's ability or willingness to complete the purchase."
In the case of Austin vs. Richards 304 P. 2d, 1932 (Cal.) it
was held as follows:
"The execution of a contract of sale by the vendor of realty
was conclusive proof that he was satisfied as to the qualifications of the purchaser and of purchaser's ability to perform the contract and vendor was liable for broker's commission and was estopped by such approval from denying
such liability."
Also in point, see Beazell vs. Kane 274 P. 2d 224 (Cal.); Cardoza vs. Moorehouse 17 Cal. Reports 28; Myer vs. Selggio 181 P.
2d 690, 692 (Cal.); Malmstedt vs. Stillwell 294 P. 41 P. 41 (Cal.).
The trial court has apparently taken the position that the
broker is an "insurer" of good and faithful performance on the
part of the buyer and that the buyer will never become dissatisfied with his bargain and default or attempt to rescind. The case
of F.M.A. Financial Corp. vs. Builders, Inc. (Supra.), stands firmly
8

fur the proposition that the broker cannot be held to be an insL1rer

against such possibilities.

Under the facts of the case, it is ridiculous for defendants to
c:untend and error for the Court to find that the plaintiff did not
obtain a willing and able buyer for the defendants. Plaintiff did
all he was employed to do and defendants had accepted the terms
of the offer of the Malloys and had accepted the Malloys as "ready,
willing and able buyers".

POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE PLAINTIFF WAS AN UNDISCLOSED AGENT FOR FEE
FOR BOTH THE BUYERS AND SELLERS IN SAID SUBJECT
TRANSACTION.
Inasmuch as the defendants declined to testify, the only evidence on this point would have to come from the plaintiff and
its witnesses. The only evidence before the Court is as follows:
Transcript Page 49:

"BY MR. HANDY:
Q. Your name is R. Gene Allphin and you have previously
testified in this matter and taken the oath?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Allphin, will you state whether or not at any time
you informed Mrs. Kingston that the Real Estate Exchange had a listing on the property of the Malloys' as
well as on The Wheel?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And when was this conversation had?
A. When I showed her the Malloy property, I told her that
I had the listing.
Q. On the Malloy property also?
A. Yes.
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Q. Now, did you have a conversation where you informed
Mrs. Kingston that you were working for both parties
in this matter?
A. Yes.

Q. Where and when?
A. When I wrote up the final contract."
Transcript Page SI:
"TIIE WITNESS: The day that I made the Earnest Money
Contract between the Malloys and Mrs. Kingston at The
Wheel. When they sat down at this table and talked this
arrangement over between theCT, I told them at that time
I represented both parties and I couldn't take side issue.
MR. HANDY:

Q. Was there anything said about that by either party?
A. No."

If this testimony had been false, it would have been a simple thing for the defendant to be sworn and deny such testimony.
Further, in aiding the Court to arrive at the truth of the matter,
it would have been the duty of the defendant, if such testimony
was false, to deny it. Defendants made no claim to the Court of
prejudice. It is also significant that when the Court pronounced
its decision and rendered Judgment at the conclusion of the evidence, this point was not mentioned by the Court nor referred to
in the slightest manner.
The defendants were well aware that this transaction involved an exchange of properties. They were well aware that the
Real Estate Exchange had a listing on both of the properties to
be exchanged and further in the Exclusive Sales Agency Contract
identified as plaintiff's Exhibit A, it authorized the plaintiff to
either sell or exchange the prop2rty of seller and agreed "If an
exchange is made, I agree to pay commission to you on the above
10

snlc pticc and that you may collect commissions on all properties
uiPolvcd in the transaction."

POINT 3. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT PAYMENT OF THE
COMMISSION OUT OF THE MONTHLY PAYMENTS MADE
IN ACCORDANCE TO THE ESCROW AGREEMENT AND
THAT THE PURCHASERS MADE NO PAYMENT ON SAID
CONTRACT EXCEPT AS HEREINBEFORE SET FORTH.
The Court obviously was in error in finding that no payments had been made on the contract except the $445.00 mentioned in paragraph 7 of the Findings in that even a casual consideration of defendants' Exhibit No. I, which is the Uniform
Real Estate Contract, shows that the sellers acknowledged receiving $6,880.00 as a down payment from the purchasers and
just as casual an observation of plaintiff's Exhibits F and G show
that an additional $645.00 was paid to the sellers by the purchasers.
It is important to recall the sequence of events in this matter. On February 15, 1964, defendants signed an Exclusive Sales
AgPncy Contract with plaintiff which provided for the payment
of a six per cent (63) commission on sale or exchange of defendants' properties (Exhibit A); on July 7, 1964, an Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was signed by George W.
Malloy and Audrey M. Malloy as Buyers, and Dorothy Kingston
as Sellers (Exxhibit B); on July 24, 1964, Earnest Money Receipt
and Offer to Purchase was signed by George W. Malloy and
Audrey M. Malloy as Buyers and Dorothy Kingston as Seller
(Exhibit C); on August 19, 1964, Uniform Real Estate Contract
which incorporated the terms of the July 24, 1964 offer and
which was signed by Malloys as Buyers and Mark Allen King'1011 and Dorothy Kingston as Sellers; on August 28, 1964, an
Escrow Agreement, signed by Malloys as Grantees and Kingstons
11

as Grantors (Exhibit 2); on the same date a Warranty Deed
from the Malloys to the Kingstons for the Malloys' interest in
the Davis County property was executed (Exhibit 3), together
with the other necessary documents.
The above sequence of events is necessary in order to show
that well before the Escrow Agreement was signed by Buyer and
Seller, and to which plaintiff was not a party, the plaintiff had
found a ready, willing and able buyer for the Seller on terms
aceptable to the seller and was therefore entitled to his commission (Curtis vs. Mortenson Supra.). Plaintiff had fully performed
his part of the contract known as the Exclusive Sales Agency Con
tract and at that time was entitled to his commission for services
rendered.
There can be no doubt that on August 19, 1964, when the
Uniform Real Estate Contract was signed by both buyers and
sellers incorporating the terms of the July 24th Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase that plaintiff had fully performed
his obligations under the contract and had earned its commission
(Curtis vs. Mortenson supra., F.M.A. Financial Corp. vs. Build,
Inc., supra., Lipton vs. Johansen 233 P. 2d 648 (Cal.), Cardoza
vs Moorehouse 17 Cal. Reports 28, Diamond vs. Huenergardt 346
P. 2d 37 (Cal.) Austin vs. Richards 304 P. 2d 132 (Cal.).
The Court has erroneously concluded that the expression contained in the Escrow Agreement "The escrow agent is authroized
to expend from each monthly payment received the following:
"* * also $87.50 payable to Real Estate Exchange at 2421 Kiesel
Ave., Ogden, Utah, until the real estate commission in the amount
of $3,900.00 is paid in full", (italics ours) was an agreement on
the part of plaintiff to accept its commission piecemeal when and
if certain agreed payments are made by the buyer. Nowhere in
this agreement, to which plaintiff was not a party, does plaintiff
substitute its right to a commission already earned for one which

12
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never be received. It is folly to so contend and so find. It

, ,urnot. by the weirdest stretch of the imagination seriously be
,. 011

1cnclcd that the sellers' direction to the escrow agent to dis-

trihute a portion of the monthly payment to plaintiff to apply
on the fee earned was an agreement on the part of plaintiff to
forego its commission except and when the monthly payments
were made. Clearly, the intention of the parties was that even
though the listing agreement provided for payment of a real estate ('()mmission in the event of an exchange of properties, that
inasmuch ns sellers-defendants had not received cash for their
equity that plaintiff should at least have the security of receiving
a portion of the monies received on the contract until such time
1s the Malloy property received in exchange as a down payment
was sold (T. 37). There never was an assignment of the Escrow
funds or any part to plaintiff. And plaintiff, not being a party
to the Escrow agreement, never could have urged the enforcement of any of its provisions on his behalf. Can it seriously be
contended that the plaintiff would forego its right to the commission as agreed, when it had obtained the conveyance to defendants of an equity in Malloys' property valued at from $6,880
to $7,200 and had the deed recorded? To so find would be to
find that a new contract had been entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants after the plaintiff had fully earned its
commission and such new contract, if any, is totally without consideration, and therefore would be void and not binding on the
plaintiff. Conclusive on this point is the following quote from
P.M.A. Financial Fund Corp. vs. Build, Inc., Supra.:
"The plaintiff's claim of accord and satisfaction is premised
on a statement which it avers that Mr. Cook (of Cook Realty)
made to Mr. Stromness in talking over the difficulties the
latter was having with the sale: 'Richard, make one more
payment today and let's forget the whole thing' and that
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the defendant made such a payment. The general rule, ana
the rule which this court has followed, is that where a claim
is for a definite and undisputed amount which is past due.
an agreement by the creditor (Cook) to take a lesser amount
which is pa.id, does not discharge the whole debt. This
so because the creditor receives only what he is entitled to
and there is no consideration for the new agreement.

i;

"It is true that the modern trend is to be cautious about
rigidly applying this rule aPd that courts are generally
somewhat indulgent toward finding consideration somewhere in the new arrangement, such as that it was to settle
a dispute, or that there is some advantage to the creditor
in accepting the lesser amount, where the unreasoning adherence to the rule might result in inequity. But we perceive nothing in this case to persuade us that the trial court
was wrong in failing to so judge this situation. In fact, the
contrary appears. Accepting the defendant's argument would
result in giving him the duplex he received as a down pay·
ment, together with the other benefits of the sale a.nd relieve him of his obligation to pay the agreed commission."
(Italics ours.)

See Am. fur. 2d Vol. 12, p. 798 Sec. 35:

"If a broker's contract is the ordinary one that is terminable
at the will of the principal at any time if it is still executory,

a modification of it need not be supported by new consideration. Where however, there is such a mutuality or reci·
procity of consideration as to deprive the principa.l of the
absolute right of determining the contract or as to make the
contract mutually obligatory, there can be no valid modifi·
cation of it without some consideration moving to the party
who would be adversely affected nor can there be any en·
forceable, substantial modification of a broker's executed
contract unless the agreement relating thereto is founded
upon sufficient or at least some consideration.

"In accordance with these principles a consideration is necessary for an agreement between the principal and broker
to release earned commissions, to postpone their payment,
to ma.ke such payment contingent upon the happening ol
cer tain events or to withdraw from the contract after the
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broker has entered upon a performance of his undertaking."
(Italics ours.)
Am. fur. 2d Vol. 12, p. 799, Sec. 36:
"H'here, however, the contract is executed or some services
had been performed by the broker, substantial consideration
is necessary to support his agreement to modify the terms
of the contract as to compensation." (Italics ours.)

To the same effect, see 12 Corpus Juris Secundum p. 149, Sec.
ti4 (Brokers):
"In order that a broker's right to compensation may rest
upon a new or modified contract rather than upon the original contract of employment, it is essential that both parties
assent to the change or modification and that a new or modified contract be based on a sufficient consideration. (Italics
ours.)
In the case of John Reis Co., vs Zimmerli 120 N.E. 692 N.Y.,
plaintiff was employed by defendant to sell certain real estate.
Thereafter he found a ready, willing and able purchaser and e.
contract was entered int:o between seller and purchaser. The contract contained the following clause: "The seller agrees that Mr.
Ohnewald of Reis & Company brought about this sale and agrees
tu pay the broker's commission therefor and who shall be entitled
to his commission upon title passing." (Italics ours.)
'The Court of Appeals of New York in reversing the trial
Court held:
'At the time the contract was signed, Ohnewald had procured a purchaser and his right to his commission had accrued (citing cases). It is true that when the written contract was prepared for execution, he expressed his willingness, if it would be more convenient for defendant, to wait
until title passed. But his contract with defendant had been
fnllv executed bv him and the defendant could not be relcas.ed from his liability to pay commissions without a consideration (citing cases). There was no evidence of any
promise on the part of the defendant to do what he was not
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already obligated to do (citing cases). Ohnewald's agree.
ment to wait was therefore Nudum Pactum and was unen.
forceable.' "
See also Miller vs. Rossiter 209 N.Y.S. 767:
"The action was for brokerage commission earned in procuring a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy on de.
fendant's terms. A contract of sale was entered into. Immediately thereafter the broker made an agreement to wait for
payment of his commission 'when as and if title closes'. Objections were made to the titl::- and by mutual agreement,
the contract was rescinded; the money paid on account returned to the purchaser and the defendants paid the expenses incurred by the purchaser.
"The brokerage commission in this case was earned when
the contract was entered into. The agreement made by the
broker was without consideration and unenforceable."
(Italics ours.)

See also Clarke vs. Dulien Steel Products 128 P. 2d. 608
(Cal.), Austin vs. Richards 304 P. 2d 133, 134 (Cal.), LeBlond vs
Wolfe 188 P. 2d 278 (Cal.), Cardoza vs. Moorehouse 17 Cal.
Reports 28.

If the Court were to interpret the quoted statement from the
escrow instructions as being a new contract for the payment of
the broker's commission, and the plaintiff was a party to such
contract, the Court would still have to find sufficient considera·
tion for the new contract, and even defendants do not so contend.
not having offered any evidence whatsoever and needless to say,
not on this point.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff fully executed his contract with the defendants
in that it obtained for the defendants a ready, willing and able
buyer on terms acceptable to the sellers; that said buyers entered
into a written, binding contract with the sellers; that through the
16

li•n ts ()f the plaintiff the defendants have been enriched in the
,, 1111 of $7,645.00; that the sellers-defendants knew that plaintiff
i• l"csc11tecl both the buyer and the seller and such a possibility
11 :l'- c,intcmplated as shown by the Listing Agreement, the two
1:" 111 cst Money Receipts and Offer to Purchase and the Uniform
f{!'al Estate Contract; that the only evidence before the Court was
ih;it plaintiff has disclosed to defendants-sellers such fact-that
nlnintiff's commission was earned prior to the Escrow Agreement
being c'ntcred into between· the purchasers and the sellers and
rlwrc has been no modification of the contract for commission between plaintiff and defendants-sellers. For this reason the Judgment of the Court should be reversed with instructions that
judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum
of $1,900.00 together with a reasonable attorney's fee.
I

Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE B. HANDY

Attorney for Appellant
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